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Notes
Brave New Circuit: Creeping Towards
DNA Database Dystopia in U.S. v.
Weikert
INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 2007, in a matter of first impression, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of requiring current or former prisoners to
produce a blood sample for the purpose of creating a DNA profile
and entering it into a centralized database. 1 In United States v.
Weikert, a divided Court joined every other federal circuit that has
confronted the issue in holding that the taking of a supervised
releasee's blood, the creation of a digital DNA profile and entry of
this profile into the FBI's centralized DNA database "CODIS" is
not an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
2
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Although perhaps otherwise unremarkable from other circuit
courts' Fourth Amendment DNA database cases, Weikert is
emblematic of the unintelligibility in this area of the law. It is
thus in many ways a fitting case to examine, as its anonymity
itself is illustrative of how the crucial issue of genetic searches has
proceeded to sneak under the constitutional radar. Some circuits
have found the mandatory collection of DNA and entry into the
federal DNA database constitutional under what is called the
"special needs" test and others under the "totality of the
circumstances" test. Regardless of the nomenclature the courts
1.
2.

United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
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have assigned to their analyses, ultimately they are guilty of
nonsensical results-oriented reasoning. Weikert is no exception in
this regard. Even though the First Circuit is almost certainly
correct that in light of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
Samson v. California3 the totality of the circumstances test must
be applied to a supervised releasee's claim that using his DNA in a
database is an unreasonable search and seizure, which test is
applied is ultimately irrelevant.
This casenote attempts to present a sample of the array of
problems in the area of Fourth Amendment searches as applied to
the creation and maintenance of a DNA database by focusing on
the Weikert decision. It argues that DNA extraction and storage
in a national database is an unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment-in opposition to the Weikert
decision, and indeed every circuit court.
Part I provides the statutory and scientific background of
felons' DNA sample collection and the entry of this information
into the FBI database CODIS. Part II provides the factual
background of defendant Weikert's situation and the rationale of
the lower court's decision, and closely examines the First Circuit
Weikert decision, comparing it to the lower court decision as well
as scrutinizing the reasoning the majority engages in and the
authorities it relies upon in supporting its holding.
Part III argues that even under the totality of the
circumstances analysis, the balancing of the privacy interests of
supervised releasees subjected to DNA profiling and analysis
against the governmental interest in law enforcement favors the
supervised releasee for two reasons. First, the totality of the
circumstances weigh in favor of an individual supervised releasee
because there is a lack of proof that a DNA database addresses
any of the governmental goals that the First Circuit assumes it
does, thus undermining the weight of the "governmental interest."
Second, because a supervised releasee regains the full privacy
interest of a normal citizen upon completion of the supervised
release program, his full privacy rights subject to full Fourth
Amendment protections outweigh the government's stated goals in
creation of a DNA database. Further weighing against the
government interest in entering an individual's DNA information
3. Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).
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into a centralized computer database is the possibility that the
sampling of a person's DNA, creation of a DNA profile and even
the act of matching DNA profiles within the computerized
database are all separate searches requiring individual and
distinct Fourth Amendment analyses.
Under this broader vision of what the "totality" of the
circumstances is, the Weikert decision is unpersuasive. Despite
the First Circuit's refusal to confront the issue of whether
retention of a supervised releasee's DNA profile and sample are
constitutional after the period of supervised release is complete,
the Weikert decision is but another link in a chain of cases in
which the judiciary has been hypnotized by technology and
thereby sacrificed the Fourth Amendment to the enticing
conveniences of forensic science.
PART

I.

SCIENTIFIC AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. DNA Profiling
Humans are made up of millions of microscopic cells. 4 The
most crucial part of the cell for the science of genetics is the
nucleus-the spherical inner part of the cell. 5 The nucleus houses
numerous threadlike, linear microscopic strands, called
chromosomes. 6 The core of each chromosome is made up of a long,
'7
thin thread of deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly known as "DNA."
The DNA molecule itself is a double thread, which is twisted into
a helical shape.8 The genetically important portion of DNA are
four nucleotides, also called "bases" (abbreviated A, T, G, and C),
which pair together. 9 The DNA molecule can thus be visualized
as a "twisted rope ladder with four kinds of stairsteps." 10 Each
chromosome has base pairs (the "rungs" in the ladder) in a specific
4. National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, The Future of
Forensic DNA Testing: Predictionsof the Research and Development Working
Group, (Nov. 2000), at 8, [hereinafter National Commission] available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id.
9. Id. (A always pairs with T and G with C, such that the combinations
possible of any base pair is AT, TA, GC, or CG).

10.

Id.
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order and it is this sequence which determines genetic
individuality." A cell in the human body contains roughly 6
billion base pairs and any DNA samples from two unrelated
persons differ in only about one base pair per thousand. 12
A gene is a section of DNA from 1,000 to 100,000 or more base
pairs in length that has a specific function, usually encoding how
to make specific proteins. 13 Proteins encoded by genes make up
the body's physical cells, and are indispensable for a majority of
the body's functions. 14 In fact, every gene has a particular position
on a given chromosome, called a "locus" (plural "loci"). 1 5 Only a

small amount of DNA, roughly 3-5 percent is genes. 16 The vast
majority of DNA has no currently ascertainable purpose and is
commonly referred to as "junk DNA."' 7 A DNA "profile" refers to
an individual's genetic pattern for the group of loci involved in
8
forensic DNA analysis.'
Although there are multiple methods which can be used to
create a genetic profile of a human being, the most common
method for DNA identification is the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) technique. 1 9 This method takes a small tissue sample and
uses it to create a plethora of copies of the DNA present, so that
an amount of DNA sufficient to be analyzed is produced. 20 Once
this DNA copy is created, "'short tandem repeat' technology (STR)
is used to identify genetic locations to distinguish DNA profiles by
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. National Commission, supra note 5, at 11; Lisa Schriner Lewis,
Comment, The Role Genetic Information Plays in the Criminal Justice
System, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 519, 522 (2005).
14. Lewis, supra note 14, at 522.
15. National Commission, supra note 5, at 11.
16. National Commission, supra note 5, at 12; Lewis, supra note 14, at
521.
17. National Commission, supra note 5, at 12; see also Lewis, supra note
14, at 521, n. 16 (referring to this portion of DNA as "junk DNA").
18. National Commission, supra note 5, at 12.
19. Lewis, supra note 14, at 522; Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an
Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment?
What Should (and Will) The Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 165,
166 (2006).
20. Lewis, supra note 14, at 522-23; Maclin, supra note 20, at 166. Such
a biological sample can be obtained from blood, hair, semen, cheek cells, skin

cells, bones, and even cigarette butts, shirt collars, hats, weapons, bottles,
envelopes and urine. Maclin, supra note 20, at 166; CODIS Brochure,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/codisbrochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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examining the gene sequence on a specific location on a
chromosome and comparing that length with the gene sequence on
the chromosome from another individual. '2 1 In forensic DNA
analysis a standard battery of thirteen locations are used to create
a genetic profile. 22 Thus in lay terms, using a human biological
sample the gene sequence lengths at thirteen standardized
locations are measured. These measurements are represented by
numerals, which can be uploaded into a database. When a DNA
database is searched, this thirteen measurement profile is
compared with others within the database with the goal of finding
a matching profile-a profile which has the same measurements
at these same thirteen locations.
B. Government Use of Forensic DNA Evidence: The FBI and
CODIS
Forensic DNA testing in the United States is a technology
that is only two decades old.2 3 DNA testing and profiling by the
government was first instituted against convicted sex-offenders
and was rationalized by the belief that such offenders have a
particularly high recidivism rate. 2 4 Yet subsequent data never
confirmed the assumption that recidivism rates were dramatically
high for sex offenders as compared with other offenders. 25 DNA
databases were subsequently expanded to include not only
offenders believed to have high recidivism rates, such as violent
offenders, but other types of offenders as well. 26 Presently all fifty
states statutorily mandate DNA sample collection from
27
individuals convicted of certain felonies.
In 1990 the FBI began a pilot software project for fourteen
state and local laboratories called the "Combined DNA Index
System" (CODIS) which is touted as "blend[ing] forensic science
21. Maclin, supra note 20, at 166.
22. National Commission, supra note 5, at 19; CODIS Brochure, supra
note 21.

23. The first U.S. case admitting DNA evidence was Andrews v. State,
533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
24. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIs.
L. REV. 413, 415-16 (2003).
25. Id. at 416.
26. Maclin, supranote 20, at 165.
27. Id.
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and computer technology into an effective tool for solving crime. ' '28
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 statutorily authorized the FBI
"to establish a National DNA Index System (NDIS) for law
enforcement purposes. '2 9 Regardless of their geographic location
within the U.S., forensic laboratories that participate in NDIS can
exchange and compare DNA profiles within the database with
30
other participating laboratories.
According to the FBI, CODIS uses biological evidence
recovered from crime scenes to generate investigative leads
utilizing two of the CODIS indices: the Forensic Index (containing
DNA profiles developed from crime scene evidence) and the
Convicted Offender Index (containing DNA profiles of individuals
convicted of crimes), which are searched by computer. 3 1 Matches
made between profiles in the Forensic Index can link crime scenes
to identify a potential serial offender who has left DNA at more
than one crime scene, while matches made between the Forensic
and Convicted Offender Indexes supply the identities of suspected
perpetrators by matching DNA information left at a crime scene
with the DNA profile of a known and identifiable convict or exconvict. 32

CODIS and NDIS have grown exponentially in the last few
years. Presently, over 170 law enforcement laboratories in the
28. CODIS Brochure, supra note 21; Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory Services, CODIS-Crime, www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/htmllcodis3.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter CODIS website].
29. CODIS website, supra note 29. In addition to NDIS (referred to as
"the highest level in the CODIS hierarchy"), CODIS also supports the State
DNA Index System (SDIS) which allows laboratories within states to
exchange DNA profiles and the Local DNA Index System (LDIS) where all
DNA profiles originate, "then flow to SDIS and NDIS." CODIS Brochure,
supranote 21.
30. CODIS Brochure, supra note 21.
31. CODIS website, supra note 29. In addition to these two indices,
CODIS is also made up of an Arrestee Index (containing DNA profiles of
arrested persons if state law allows for the collection of arrestee samples); a
Missing Persons Index (containing DNA reference profiles from missing
persons); an Unidentified Human Remains Index (containing DNA profiles
developed from unidentified human remains); and a Biological Relatives of
Missing Persons Index (containing DNA profiles voluntarily contributed from
relatives of missing persons). CODIS Brochure, supranote 21.
32. CODIS website, supra note 29; National Commission, supra note 5, at
20 (CODIS does not contain social security numbers, criminal history, or
case-related information, but does store information necessary for obtaining
profile matches).
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United States participate in NDIS. 33 The total number of
convicted offender profiles in CODIS has increased more than tenfold since 2000, topping out at an astounding 6,539,919 as of
December 2008.34 The FBI also claims that through December
35
2008, 80,900 investigations have been aided by CODIS.
As previously stated, the thirteen measurement loci used in
creating a DNA profile are thought to be junk DNA-that is, the
genes at these loci are widely believe to possess no known genetic
purpose that correlates with any perceptible physical attribute of
human beings. 3 6 However, even using these measurements in the
CODIS database means that it is still likely that a search of the
database can identify a person who is a relative of the person
contributing the evidence sample, 37 thus potentially infringing
upon privacy interests of those biologically related to those whose
profiles are in CODIS. There is currently no overall policy as to
what happens to the biological samples taken after DNA profiles
are created and added to the CODIS database, but the majority of
states have policies to store and maintain such biological
samples. 3 8 This is worrisome to many because there is full and
complete genetic information (including information about an
individual's propensity for diseases, personality traits and possibly
even sexual orientation or likelihood to engage in criminal
behavior) of millions of people that is a potential scientific
research and experimentation goldmine simply waiting to be
utilized.
C. The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (DNA
Act) 39 mandates that "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall

33. CODIS Brochure, supra note 21.
Internationally forty law
enforcement laboratories in more than twenty-five nations use CODIS
software. Id.
34. NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hqflab/codis/clickmap.htm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2008).
35. CODIS Investigations Aided, www.fbi.gov/hqllab/codis/aidedmap.htm
(last visited February 15, 2009).
36. National Commission, supranote 5, at 35.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 36.
39. The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§14135 -

698 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:691
collect a DNA sample from each individual in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying
Federal offense" (including any felony, any crime of violence or
attempt, or conspiracy to commit a felony, crime of violence or
attempt).40 It also requires a probation office to collect a DNA
sample from an "individual on probation, parole, or supervised
release who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal
offense" in the past. 4 1 The DNA Act authorizes the use of means
"reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA
sample from an individual who refuses to cooperate in the
collection of the sample. ' '42 The DNA Act provides for a criminal
penalty of misdemeanor for refusal to provide a sample4 3 and
courts are required to order compliance with the DNA Act as an
44
express condition of supervised release.
Despite repeated government assurances that the genetic
markers used in DNA analysis pursuant to the DNA Act are noncoding junk DNA which do not express any genetic traits, there is
nothing in the DNA Act itself that requires the government to use
exclusively junk DNA in creating an individual's DNA profile. 4 5
This is significant because as the law now stands, if the
government chose, it could use coding genetic information to
create a DNA profile. This could empower the government to go
far beyond the matching of identities and potentially allow testing
of the full panoply of genetic information of an individual.

14135(e) (West 2008)).
40. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 14135a(a)(1) & (d)(A-G) (West 2008).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14135a(a)(2) & (d)(A-G) (West 2008).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a)(4)(A) (West 2008).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a)(5)(A) (West 2008). A Class A misdemeanor is
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of $100,000. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3571(b)(5) (West 2008).
44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(d) (West 2008).
45. See e.g. H.R. REP. No. 106-900(I) at 27 (2000), 2000 WL 1420163
(letter of Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to The Honorable Henry
J. Hyde, Chairman House Judiciary Committee) (noting that DNA profiles
rely on junk DNA that are not associated with any human traits). Cf. United
States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 n.10 (1st Cir. 2007) (pointing out that the
use of junk DNA is neither statutorily mandated nor required by regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General under the DNA Act).
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PART II. BACKGROUND TO THE FIRST CIRCUIT DECISION OF U.S. V.
WEIKERT

A. Factual and Procedural Background of the District Court
Decision
Defendant Leo Weikert pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess

cocaine with intent to distribute in 1990, and was incarcerated in
the Western District of Texas in February of 1991.46 He managed
to escape, only to be caught again and charged with escape from
custody, to which he pleaded guilty in October of 1999. 4 7 The
following January Weikert was sentenced to eight months
incarceration (to be served consecutively with the balance of the
previous cocaine sentence) followed by two years of supervised
release. 48 Weikert was released from incarceration on December
10, 2004 and alleged that his probation office notified him of its
intent to take his blood sample to collect his DNA. 4 9 On
November 16, 2005 Weikert filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Request for Hearing, asking the District Court to
prohibit the government from taking a blood sample from him and
50
entering his DNA into CODIS.
The case came before District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, which framed the issue as whether "the forced
extraction of [a supervised releasee's] blood and DNA, absent a
warrant or individualized suspicion, violates the Fourth
51
Amendment" prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
The District Court held the following: because the case dealt with
the constitutionality of a warrantless search that was not
grounded on individualized suspicion the special needs test was
the appropriate analysis 52 and the government lacked a
cognizable special need because in taking DNA samples, crimesolving was its primary objective. 5 3 Moreover, the District Court
found that Weikert's claim that the DNA Act provided for
United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 260 (D.Mass. 2006).
47. Id. at 260-61.
48. Id. at 261.
46.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
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unconstitutional searches of supervised releasees even in the
absence of individualized suspicion would probably be successful
on the merits irrespective of a court's finding that a governmental
special need existed. 5 4 The District Court, finding that the other
elements of a Preliminary Injunction (the possibility of irreparable
injury, the balance of harm, and the public interest) 5 5 weighed in
Weikert's favor, granted the motion. 56 The Government appealed
57
the case to the First Circuit.
B. Overview of the Controlling Law
In a 2-1 decision, the First Circuit joined eleven other circuits
in U.S. v. Weikert by holding that it is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
to require an individual on supervised release to provide a DNA
sample for the purpose of creating a DNA profile and entering it
into a centralized database. 58 The First Circuit interpreted the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Samson v. California59 as
requiring that the court apply the totality of the circumstances
analysis rather than the special needs analysis used by a minority
60
of circuits in determining the constitutionality of DNA sampling.
The court declined to resolve whether retention of Weikert's DNA
profile in the database after his term of supervised release expired
was constitutional. 6 1 The dissent, distinguishing the case from
the limited circumstances validating the legality of the search in
Samson, would have held the suspicionless search of Weikert
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it failed to
62
meet the Samson criteria.
1. General Fourth Amendment Background
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 272.
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id. at 2-3.
Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).
Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
63
seized.
In broad strokes, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to require a judicial warrant based upon
probable cause, unless the search is among one of the established
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 64 The reasonability
requirement of the Fourth Amendment presents the strongest
constitutional argument against the existence and expansion of
the government's DNA databases. 65 Part of the problem in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment as it applies to DNA
databanks is that the practice of taking, measuring, and
comparing human DNA samples is not clearly analogous to any of
the searches and seizures contemplated by the Founders at the
66
time the Constitution was drafted.
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure
scheme was essentially property-based; it was created and
interpreted to protect a citizen's rights only in his tangible
property. 6 7 The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the first
part of the 20th century "revolved around a property axis," 68 and
the idea that the law and the Constitution protected privacy, in
the form of information either about ones' person or relationships,
was unknown. 6 9 This conceptualization of searches and seizures
was succinctly put forth in 1928 in Olmstead v. U.S., in which the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected only "material
things."

70

63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. Kaye & Smith, supra note 25, at 442.
65. Kaye & Smith, supra note 25, at 442; Jason Tarricone, Comment, 'An
Ordinary Citizen Just Like Everyone Else:" The Indefinite Retention of Former
Offenders'DNA, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 209, 217 (2005-06).
66. Kaye & Smith, supra note 25, at 444.
67. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under
the FourthAmendment, 74 TEx. L. REV. 49, 54 (1995).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (The full quote
reads "The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
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The Warren Court 71 is credited with the paradigmatic shift
towards a privacy-based model of interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. 7 2 Scientific advancement and technological change
caused a re-conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment's role and
the protections it provides to American citizens. 73 In 1967, the
landmark decision Katz v. U.S. clearly elucidated a radically
different conception of the Fourth Amendment: that it "protects
people, not places." 7 4 Katz was a watershed decision in that it was
the first to recognize that intangible information, rather than real
property or chattels, was protected from searches and seizures
under the Constitution.
The "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis is "the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
75
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."
Establishing the reasonableness of a search normally necessitates
that the government demonstrate probable cause to a neutral
magistrate and obtain a particularized warrant authorizing the
search. 7 6 However, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions
to these requirements, one of which is the special needs doctrine.
2. The Special Needs Doctrine
The term "special needs" first appeared in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 77 In T.L.O., Blackmun
agreed with the majority that there were limited exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment in which the reasonableness of a search is

things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects. The description of
the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that it must specify
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.")
71. Chief Justice Earl Warren, October 5, 1953-June 23, 1969.
72. Krent, supra note 68, at 60.
73. Id. at 57.
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Supreme Court
held that, given the expectation of privacy that people have for their
conversations in public telephone booths, the attachment of an electronic
listening device to the glass of the booth by law enforcement personnel was a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 359.
75. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
76. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972).
77. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.
concurring).
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determined by engaging in a balancing test in which the weight of
the governmental interest is compared with that of private
interests. 78 However, he concluded that such a balancing test
should only be applied "in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make
the
warrant
and
probable-cause
requirement
impracticable." 7 9 In addition to the Weikert dissent and the
District Court's decision, a minority of federal circuit courts have
applied the special needs analysis in confronting the question of
the constitutionality of the federal DNA Act or a corresponding
80
state law analog under the Fourth Amendment.
Several Supreme Court rulings in the last ten years have had
a great deal of influence on the issue of what Fourth Amendment
test to apply to the DNA Act, albeit in a sometimes oblique
manner. These cases culminate in the most recent decision of
Samson v. California,8 1 but because most circuit courts
determined the DNA Act to be constitutional prior to Samson, to
understand the special needs doctrine, it is necessary to review
the relevant earlier Supreme Court caselaw.
Two highly influential cases regarding the special needs
analysis, City of Indianapolisv. Edmond8 2 and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,8 3 dealt with the scope of permissible warrantless
searches and seizures upon persons when the government lacked
any individualized suspicion. In Edmond, the Supreme Court
held that because the primary purpose of the highway checkpoint
program was not distinguishable from the City's general interest
in crime control, the special needs warrantless exception did not

78.
79.

Id.
Id. The so-called "special needs" doctrine has been used to analyze

searches in a variety of contexts where the government has neither obtained
a warrant nor established individualized suspicion. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 6.
80. See generally United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007)
(collecting DNA for DNA index qualifies as special need); United States v.
Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006) (collection of DNA did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding the DNA Act constitutional under both the special needs and the
totality of the circumstances analysis); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d
1132 (10th Cir. 2003) (DNA Act constitutional under special needs exception).
81. Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).
82. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
83. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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84
apply and the program violated the Fourth Amendment.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Ferguson that the
governmental interest in preventing pregnant women from
abusing cocaine by means of the imposition of criminal penalties
was not a valid special need that permitted departure from the
85
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Together, these two cases seems to stand for the proposition
that the special needs doctrine 8 6 can only be applied to programs
of searches and seizures which have a primary purpose other than
catching or deterring offenders, which is a general interest in law
enforcement. From its inception, it is impossible to deny that the
primary purpose of the DNA database CODIS program has been
to catch offenders, 8 7 leading some academics to find that in the
wake of Ferguson and Edmond it would be highly unlikely that
any law enforcement data bank could be deemed constitutional
and that these decisions completely undermine the Fourth
88
Amendment DNA database cases that precede them.
Interestingly, the District Court determined that it clearly must
apply the special needs analysis to the constitutionality of taking
89
and keeping Weikert's DNA under the DNA Act.

84. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
85. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70, 85.
86. The special needs doctrine of the Supreme Court has faced strong
academic criticism for being opaque and incomprehensible. See, e.g. Maclin,
supra note 20, at 170 (pointing out the incoherence of the special needs
doctrine and the lack of effort on the part of the court to enumerate what the
special needs are).
87. CODIS website, supra note 29; see also David H. Kaye, The Science of
DNA Identification: From the Laboratory to the Courtroom (and Beyond), 8
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH 409, 424 (2007) (noting that, despite other uses, the
reason DNA databases exist is to further criminal investigations).
88. David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law
Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 199-200 (2001) [hereinafter Two
Fallacies]; see also David H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the
Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric Data From
Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 192 (2006) (agreeing that the specialneeds analysis is not well suited to confronting the constitutional issues
posed by DNA databases).
89. United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259,263 (D.Mass 2006)
(pointing out that not only is there a circuit split on which test, special needs
or totality of the circumstances, to apply, but also that there is confusion
between the circuits as to which test is the more stringent).
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3. The Totality of the Circumstances Doctrine
In analyzing the constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment of the federal DNA Act or state equivalents, the
majority of circuit courts have applied the totality of the
circumstances analysis. 90 In Weikert, the First Circuit noted that
most of the circuit courts' decisions, as well as the District Court
decision, preceded Samson v. California, but that Samson
suggested that the totality of the circumstances test is the
appropriate analytical tool. In order to properly make sense of the
role Samson plays in the analysis of the constitutionality of the
DNA Act as it applies to supervised releasees such as Weikert, it
is again necessary to examine prior Supreme Court precedent.
A key case in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as it pertains to supervised releasees is Griffin v.
Wisconsin.9 1 In Griffin, the Court held that a warrantless search
of a probationer did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
State probation systems have special needs that render fulfillment
of the otherwise constitutionally mandated warrant requirement
"impracticable," thus justifying a replacement of the probable
cause standard with a lesser, "reasonable grounds" standard. 92
The Court in Griffin reasoned that probation is simply one type of
punishment along a sliding scale of increasing degrees of
restrictiveness and that those subject to probation are not
permitted the "absolute liberty" to which free citizens have a right,
but only have a claim to a "conditional liberty" that is predicated
upon compliance with particular enumerated limitations. 93
90. See United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006) (taking
DNA from probationer not unreasonable under totality of the circumstances);
Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring probationer to
provide DNA reasonable under totality of the circumstances); United States
v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding DNA Act constitutional under
both special needs and totality of circumstances analysis); United States v.
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005) (DNA sampling was reasonable under
totality of the circumstances); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.
2005) (collection of saliva is reasonable under totality of the circumstances);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (DNA Act reasonable
under totality of the circumstances); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354
F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (DNA from prisoners under DNA Act is reasonable
under totality of the circumstances).
91. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
92. Id. at 876.
93. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
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Although the Supreme Court recognized that a state's operation of
a probation system is a special need beyond that of normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the normal warrant
and probable cause requirements, 94 this case differed from the
later Edmond and Ferguson decisions in that there was some
suspicion of the individual searched, though not sufficient to rise
to the level of probable cause.
Fourteen years later and very shortly after deciding both
Edmond and Ferguson,the Supreme Court heard United States v.
Knights.95 Although Knights was factually similar to Griffin, the
Court abandoned the special needs test without explanation. The
Court held that the search of a probationer absent a warrant "was
reasonable under [the] general Fourth Amendment approach of
'examining the totality of the circumstances,' 96 provided that the
search was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a
condition of probation. 9 7 The Knights Court made a particular
effort to distinguish Griffin in holding that the State's concerns so
grossly outweighed Knights' limited privacy expectation that the
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion was adequate to legitimize
98
the search of a probationer's dwelling.
In broad terms, Knights essentially gave courts license to
consider warrantless searches of a supervised releasee (or
probationer/parolee) under a different analysis than special needs.
After Knights, it remained to be seen whether the Supreme Court

would consider a warrantless search of a supervised releasee with
absolutely no suspicion whatsoever to be a constitutionally

480 (1972)).
94. Id. at 874.
95. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
96. Id. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
Knights was on probation for a drug offense, and agreed to probation
conditions allowing for search of his person, property, place of residence,
vehicle, and personal effects without a search warrant, warrant for arrest, or
reasonable cause. Knights, 534 U.S.at 114. Shortly after release a sheriff put
Knights under surveillance based on suspicion that he performed acts of
vandalism. Id. at 115. A detective found suspicious objects in Knights' truck,
and proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of Knights' apartment under
the awareness of Knights' probation conditions and belief that a warrant was
unnecessary. The detective found various ammunition, chemicals, and drug
paraphernalia. Id.
97. Id. at 122.
98. Id. at 117-18 & 121.
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permitted search.
4. Adding Insult to Incarceration: Samson v. California
Samson squarely confronted this unanswered question.9 9 The
Court held that a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee by
a law enforcement officer without any level of cause whatsoever
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 10 0 The Court reasoned
that such a search was reasonable because the condition of his
release diminished or eliminated the parolee's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 10 1 The Court refused to apply the special
needs analysis to California's parole search condition "because our
holding under general Fourth Amendment principles renders such
an examination unnecessary." 10 2 The Court noted that
[A]lthough this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless
searches in limited circumstances, namely programmatic and
special needs searches, we have never held that these are the only
limited circumstances in which searches absent individualized
suspicion could be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment. In
light of California's earnest concerns respecting recidivism, public
safety, and reintegration of parolees into productive society, and
because the object of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,
our decision today is far from remarkable. Nor, given our prior
' 10 3
precedents and caveats, is it 'unprecedented.
In the aggregate, in this series of cases it seems that the
Supreme Court has come to view the lack of a warrant and lack of
99. Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2198 (2006).
100. Id. at 2202. "California law provides that every prisoner.. .on state
parole 'shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole
officer or other peace officer at any time"' regardless of the existence of a
warrant or of probable cause. Id. at 2196 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §
3067(a) (West 2000)). The petitioner, a felon on parole was walking down a
street and was spotted by a police officer who recognized him, proceeded to
search him without cause and found a plastic bag of crystal meth on his
person. Id. at 2196.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2199 n.3.
103. Id. at 2201 n.4. Lamenting the majority's decision, the dissent stated
both that "[t]he suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment
was intended to stamp out," and also that "[t]he requirement of
individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield the Framers
selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary action, caprice, and
harassment." Id. at 2203 & 2207.
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individualized suspicion (probable cause, or even the lesser
reasonablegrounds) as the trigger for immediately applying some
form of Fourth Amendment balancing analysis, instead of viewing
such warrantless searches as presumptively unconstitutional
unless supported by an exception to the warrant requirement. If
the governmental interest at issue is a general interest in crime
control, the totality of the circumstances doctrine is applied,
weighing the interest in crime control against the privacy interest
of the individual (a reduced privacy interest in the case of exprisoners-be they probationers, parolees, or supervised
releasees). If the government interest at issue is something other
than a general interest in crime control, this special need is
weighed against the privacy interest of an individual (again, a
reduced interest in the case of ex-prisoners). Alarmingly, Samson
seems in no way limited to simply probationers or parolees, but
appears to open the door to the possibility that all future
warrantless and completely suspicionless searches of any citizen
can be justified simply on the basis of the government's interest in
controlling crime. Samson holds that the Court need only balance
the government interest against the privacy interest of the
individual to find that a warrantless, completely suspicionless
search of that individual is constitutional, and the warrant
requirement, instead of being given primacy, is essentially
relegated to the status of an afterthought. 104
In contrast to Samson, for a warrantless and suspicionless
search, the Weikert District Court decision and the First Circuit's
dissent required a primary special need beyond the normal need
104. This is an incredibly frightening possibility for all U.S. citizens,
irrespective of its application to DNA databanks. Couched in the terms it is,
it will be extremely difficult under Samson for any individual who undergoes
a contested search and seizure at the hands of the government to balance his
lone, isolated, individual concerns against the staggering, monolithic, and
amorphous State need to "control crime." Framing the totality of the
circumstances in this fashion makes it seem a selfish endeavor for an
individual to cherish his privacy, and puts the onus upon individuals to
explain how their seemingly private, individual concerns are greater than the
concerns of the entire society in eradicating crime. Individual privacy
concerns are thus no longer the object the state is employed to protect, but
the obstacle to achieving all it can. Although beyond the scope of this paper,
Samson can be seen as creating a "totality of the circumstances" exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, holding essentially that 'The
government needs a warrant to search an individual, unless it doesn't.'
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for law enforcement to justify the search and if the need is tertiary
or non-extant, then the search necessarily fails Fourth
Amendment analysis. 10 5 Although a recent decision, Samson has
already faced strong criticism within the academic community
regarding its application to the Fourth Amendment question of
DNA databases, particularly for its reliance upon the "diminished
10 6
privacy interests" of released prisoners.
This series of cases exhibit a dearth of logical consistency in
both the special needs and the totality of circumstances doctrines
and as a whole foreshadow the grave issue of the niggling erosion
of the boundaries of Fourth Amendment protections. In light of
Samson, however, it seems difficult to analyze the issue of DNA
databases and searches of supervised releasees under the Fourth
Amendment using anything but the totality of the circumstances
doctrine. Based upon Samson, the First Circuit thus makes the
predictable decision that because the extraction, analysis, and
cataloging of a supervised releasee's DNA is undoubtedly a
warrantless search completely lacking in any level of suspicion of
the person tested, and because the DNA Act's primary interest is
law enforcement and a general interest in crime control, the
totality of the circumstances test applies. 10 7 Weighing the
government interest in crime control against the (currently)
diminished privacy expectation of a supervised releasee, it is not
difficult to see how the majority found that society's goal in
eradicating the scourge of crime is much more significant than the
selfish privacies of a known lawbreaker (or perhaps anyone for
that matter). Despite this, the First Circuit majority's view of the
"totality" is far from panoramic, let alone complete, and its
analysis of the DNA Act and Weikert's claim in light of Samson is
far from problem-free.

105. United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264-65 (D.Mass.
2006); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 18-20 (1st Cir. 2007); see supra
text accompanying note 63 for a summary of the dissent's argument.
106. See, e.g. Paul M. Monteleoni, Comment, DNA Databases,
Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 248 (2007)
(arguing inter alia that courts' findings of diminished privacy interests for
supervised releasees is completely conclusory).
107. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 9.
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PART

III: ANALYSIS OF THE WEIKERT DECISION

Part II traced the controlling law in the Fourth Amendment
analysis of the DNA Act as applied to supervised releasees of
whom there is no individualized suspicion to search, such as
Weikert. It showed the inconsistencies in the doctrines of special
needs and totality of the circumstances and the problems that are
potentially exacerbated by applying these tests to the technology
of DNA databases.
Nevertheless, Samson controls as U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and it is the application of Samson that
the First Circuit used in Weikert to hold that the compulsion of a
DNA sample and uploading of a profile into the FBI database was
not an unreasonable search and seizure of a supervised releasee.
Part III examines the analysis the Weikert majority used in
applying Samson to the DNA Act. Section A looks at the
governmental interests the First Circuit believed were implicated:
1) combating recidivism; 2) efficiency and accuracy; 3) promoting
reintegration of supervised releasees; 4) exoneration of the
innocent; and 5) the lack of discretion in application of the Act.
Section B examines the privacy interests of supervised releasees
such as Weikert, pointing out that 1) the reduced expectation of
privacy of supervised releasees is not eternal and eventually shifts
to a full privacy interest; and 2) the retention of DNA samples and
DNA profiles beyond the term of supervised release further
implicates privacy interests. Section C argues that given the
strong possibility that the DNA Act does not clearly address
legitimate governmental interests and that a supervised releasee's
privacy interests are much broader than courts have
acknowledged, a weighing of the totality of the circumstances is in
favor of supervised releasees like Weikert. As such, the DNA Act
and its creation of a government controlled database is an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Governmental Interest
In Samson, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search
of a parolee without warrant or cause.1 0 8 In examining the
government's interest, the Supreme Court reasoned that the State
108.

Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2202.
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had two interests to account for: reintegrating probationers into
the greater society, as well as preventing any recidivist crimes
they might commit. 10 9 The First Circuit in Weikert cited Samson
in its decision and acknowledged that it was persuaded by the
Government's "need to identify, monitor, and rehabilitate"
What the First Circuit completely
supervised releasees. 110
neglected to do in applying the Samson interpretation of the
government's interest in its balancing calculus was to confront the
issues of whether the DNA Act does in fact reduce recidivism and
thereby, or separately, promote integration and positive
citizenship of supervised releasees at all.
1. There is no Empirical Evidence Presented that DNA
Databasing Prevents Recidivism
In the latest year for which statistics are available, it is
unquestionable that recidivism is a grave problem for society and
the justice system. A study by the Department of Justice Bureau
of Justice Statistics notes that of the 272,111 persons released
from prisons in fifteen states in 1994, within three years an
estimated 67.5 percent were rearrested for a felony or serious
misdemeanor, 46.9 percent of which were reconvicted and 25.4
percent resentenced to prison for a new crime. 111 The period
all
showed an increase in rearrests within three years 11for
2
crime.
of
type
the
of
regardless
offenders in the aggregate,
Although CODIS was started only as a pilot project in 1990
and there are numerous facts to consider in looking at this type of
data, there is no hard evidence presented in Weikert that CODIS
and DNA databanks actually have any kind of deterrent effect on
supervised releasees whatsoever. It may seem that an increase in
the probability of identification of an individual would deter the
commission of crimes, but it does not follow that CODIS does in
fact have such an effect on the criminal community. To believe so,
particularly when there is no empirical proof addressing the
matter, is an act of faith by the court that makes the dangerous
109. Id. at 2197.
110. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.
111. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal
Offender Statistics, at 3, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter CriminalOffender Statistics].

112. Criminal Offender Statistics, supranote 112.
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assumption that a majority of crimes are committed after careful
and logical forethought. It ignores the strong possibility that
many crimes are or will be committed by people who (1) do not
know the CODIS database exists; (2) do not understand what
DNA analysis is; (3) are aware of the DNA database but still
believe they will not be caught; (4) are willing to take the risk that
they will be identified by their DNA; (5) do not care if they are
caught; or (6) are simply not thinking in a reasoned and coherent
fashion at all when committing a crime.
The First Circuit in Weikert reasoned:
[t]he government has an "overwhelming interest" in
maintaining a record of the identities of [supervised
releasees] because they "are more likely to commit future
criminal offenses than are average citizens"; indeed, the
interest in combating recidivism is the "very premise
behind the system of close parole supervision."'1 13
Notwithstanding the rather frightening proposition that
based on the first clause of this quote, the court seems poised to
find that the privacy interest of any group of individualswhich is
statistically more likely to commit crimes than average citizens is
"overwhelmed" by the governmental interest, 1 14 this passage
illustrates the court's blind acceptance that recidivism is actually
reduced by the DNA Act and the CODIS database.
2. CODIS is More Than Simply a More Efficient and Accurate
Form of Identification
In Weikert, the First Circuit accepted the government's
argument that its interest in solving crimes "efficiently and
accurately" is a factor to be balanced in the totality of the
circumstances. 1 15 In so doing, the court reduced DNA collection
113. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13 (quoting Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)).
114. See e.g. Kaye & Smith, supra note 25 at 420-21 (mentioning inclusion
into DNA databases based on "predictivist theory"-the idea that those once
convicted are more likely to commit crimes in the future). Kaye & Smith
criticize this theory as hard to put into practice because a variety of factors
exist, such as family background, geographic area, unemployment, age, and
sex, that are better statistical predictors of future criminality than prior
arrests or convictions. Id.
115. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14.
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and profiling to a "form of identification" which is not different
116
from fingerprinting and photographing, only more precise.
Although efficiency and accuracy are laudable law
enforcement goals, it is fallacious to reason that any new method
which is more efficient and accurate than a previous one is ipso
facto a cognizable governmental interest that merits any weight
when measured against an individual's Fourth Amendment
constitutional protections. Even assuming that DNA collection
and analysis are clearly comparable to photographing and
fingerprinting, in making this analogy no circuit has pointed to
any data whatsoever that either photographing or fingerprinting
methods have decreased recidivism or proved an effective
deterrent against crime in themselves. It would seem that if
fingerprinting and photographing were effective deterrents, fewer
than over two-thirds of ex-convicts would be arrested for recidivist
offenses and fewer than one-half would be convicted within three
years of release. Furthermore, one would also expect some type of
empirical data that recidivist rates decreased with the
introduction of photographing and fingerprinting techniques
during the 20th century. Yet neither is the case. Similarly, in the
case of DNA collection and analysis, two possibilities arise. First,
if DNA analysis is truly no different than photographs and
fingerprinting, then DNA analysis and databasing, like these
forms of identification, cannot be expected to increase efficiency by
reducing recidivism significantly. Thus, if DNA is merely a simple
form of identification, the ability of DNA database creation to
achieve the stated governmental interests is dubious. Second, if
DNA databasing does indeed reduce recidivism, it would most

116. Id. (quoting United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir.
2007)).
For further explications on the analogy between DNA and
fingerprinting databases see e.g. Kaye & Smith, supra note 25 at 421-22
(arguing that loci for typing DNA can be limited to those sites with no more
social import than fingerprinting); Kaye, Two Fallacies, supra note 89, at
181(noting that the government tends to view taking DNA as no more
contentious than fingerprinting); Lewis, supra note 14, at 524 (referring to
"DNA fingerprint[s]" present in all people); Cf. Monteleoni, supra note 107, at
255-56 (noting that DNA collection has more burdens than fingerprinting
because humans constantly shed skin cells, hair, and body oils full of DNA,
thus it has a higher potential for chilling engagement in private activities);
see also Id. at 254-55 (analogizing DNA collection to fingerprinting, which
threatens privacy and invites abuse).
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likely be because it is indeed different in kind than photographs
and fingerprints, which destroys the convenient "form of
identification" analogy, illustrating that DNA is not comparable to
previous technologies as no more than a "better" version of law
1 17
enforcement techniques already in use.
If, on the other hand, photographs and fingerprints are not
intended to have any crime-thwarting effect at all and are indeed
purely for identification purposes, it is unlikely that there is a
pressing governmental need to increase the efficiency and
accuracy of this identification process that justifies mandatory
DNA collection and cataloguing. It simply strains believability to
say that the government does not know who the people it
incarcerates are or that it does not know the identities of people
such as Weikert that it frees from prison and puts on a program of
supervised release, probation, or parole. If the government is at a
loss to determine a prisoner or ex-prisoner's identity, it has ample
means at its disposal that surely cannot be so time-consuming and
arduous that they mandate the expedient of DNA collection and
cataloguing.118

3. The DNA Act Does not Further the Goal of Promoting
Reintegration for Ex-Prisoners
Even if the DNA Act does indeed reduce recidivism and help
solve crimes efficiently and accurately, it is hard to see how it does
this in a way that also promotes reintegration for supervised

117. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Gould, J. concurring) (noting that unlike fingerprints, DNA has the capacity
to reveal large amounts of private data, including an individual's health,
likelihood of developing some diseases, race and gender, and possibly
propensity for certain types of conduct); see also Tarricone, supra note 66, at
243 (pointing out that DNA, unlike fingerprints and mugshots, carries both a
greater possibility of disclosing personal information as well as more
"psychological weight"); Krent, supra note 68, at 95-96 (arguing that in
contrast to fingerprinting, it is indisputable that taking blood and performing
DNA analysis upon it are searches under present Fourth Amendment
doctrine).
118. A further problem with the DNA Profile/Fingerprint analogy is that
the rapid expansion of government use of fingerprinting occurred prior to
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence introduced by Katz in 1967, thus
allowing the "unchecked [spread of fingerprinting without] any judicial
balancing against the personal right to privacy." Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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releasees such as Weikert. Ostensibly, a sincere, good-faith
interest in the reintegration of supervised releasees into society
would entail a goal of eventually treating them like full-fledged
members of the community. Yet DNA testing and analysis, and
more importantly the indefinite retention of one's DNA sample,
are not experiences that normal citizens must undergo and
countenance. Such a practice manifestly evidences that the state
does not now, nor ever will, trust ex-convicts as much as those
citizens without a criminal history. 119 Rather than reintegrating
ex-felons, the DNA databasing under the DNA Act is more akin to
a "genetic blacklist," by which invisible tabs can be kept on a
select portion of society. It may be entirely true that such distrust
of convicts, probationers, parolees and supervised releasees is
prudent and justified. However, it is disingenuous to couch the
DNA database as a governmental interest that does anything but
ostracize, rather than integrate, ex-felons.
4. CODIS is not Necessary for Suspect Exoneration
In Weikert, the First Circuit argued that use of CODIS has
the potential to exonerate criminal suspects who are in fact
innocent. Further, by systematically excluding those within the
database whose profile does not match DNA recovered at a crime
scene, the First Circuit also contends that the DNA Act actually
120
protects these individuals from becoming "potential suspects."
Yet no reason was given why a comprehensive, centralized DNA
database in the exclusive hands of the government is necessary to
exonerate someone wrongly suspected, accused, or convicted of a
specific crime. A suspect or a defendant, against either of whom
there is individualized suspicion for commission of a crime, might
be reasonably compelled to undergo DNA profiling and search via
issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate (or may indeed
volunteer this information in order to exonerate themself). But a
pre-emptive DNA profiling program such as CODIS essentially
treats all those subject to its purvue as inherently suspect for any

119. See Tarricone, supra note 66, at 242 - 44 (arguing that retaining a
person's DNA post-release sends a message to ex-felons that they are not to
be trusted and is antithetical to the ideals of reducing recidivism and
reintegrating them into society).
120. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14 (quoting Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, at 88).
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given crime. Moreover, in CODIS the government possesses the
monopoly on the means by which innocence can be proven. To
claim, as the First Circuit did in Weikert, that the DNA Act
"protects innocent individuals," is to view citizens as
presumptively guilty, rather than presumptively innocent. One
possible use of CODIS may be to exonerate innocent individuals,
but it is by no means a necessary precondition to doing so. A casespecific determination in which the standards of individualized
suspicion and the issuance of warrants are required could function
just as well to 'protect innocent individuals.'
5. Discretionless, Mandatory Searching is not a Protectionof
Fourth Amendment Rights
The court in Weikert also mentioned as a factor weighing in
the government's favor the lack of discretion in the DNA Act as a
guard against constitutional abuse. The First Circuit found that
the DNA Act obviates the possibility of discretionary abuse in its
application, 12 1 because collection of a DNA sample is mandatory
for those on probation, parole, supervised release or who have
been convicted of a qualifying offense. 122 It concluded that
through the elimination of the possibility of discretion, the
potential for "selective enforcement or harassment" is eradicated,
which in turn prevents the government interest from becoming
23
"diluted."1
It is not clear how or why selective enforcement or
harassment 'dilutes' a governmental interest any more than
This line of
mandatory enforcement or harassment would.
reasoning, that a search and seizure can be made more reasonable
simply by imposing it non-arbitrarily upon more people, is
fantastic. Under such logic, to further protect the threatened
Fourth Amendment rights of targeted groups, the solution is not
to cease or curtail the targeting activity, but simply to expand the
121. See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14 (The Weikert majority noted that the
DNA Act does not have a discretionary component, and that the presence of
discretion in application affects balancing interests). The reason given is
because the power of discretion in application may cause dignitary harms to
parolees, which can be a source of resentment and consequently sabotage a
parolee's reintegration into society. Id. (citing Samson v. California, 126
S.Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006).
122. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14135 a(a)(2)).
123. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14.
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pool of targets. 124 Taken to its extreme, such rationalization could
justify any and all manner of constitutionally suspect activity
simply by making such activity universally applicable to all
citizens. This approach is not only illogical, but also irresponsible
for a court to so casually endorse.
6. Summary of the Government's Interests
In addition to the opacity as to what actually comprises the
government's interests in taking a supervised releasee's DNA,
grave doubts exist as to whether the DNA Act is effective in
meeting the government's claimed interests. The Weikert majority
did not seriously call into question these issues and took the
government's assertions of what its interests are and the import it
accords to those interests at face value. Yet, in a totality of the
circumstances analysis, the questionability of the government's
stated goals and a demonstrated lack of empirical evidence that
the DNA Act does in fact address these goals would seem to make
the weight of the government's interest appreciably lighter than
that given to it in Weikert.
B. Privacy Interests of Supervised Releasees
In the totality of the circumstances test, the government
interest in conducting a search must be weighed against the
privacy interest of the person to be searched. Although the First
Circuit found in Weikert that a supervised releasee's reduced
expectation of privacy is outweighed by the government interests
involved, it confined its holding specifically to current supervised

124. See, e.g. Tarricone, supra note 66, at 245 (pointing out that some
groups disturbed by the imbalanced effects of DNA collection on poor and
minorities might prefer mandatory DNA databasing, while proponents of
individual rights would likely oppose such an idea); Monteleoni, supra note
107, at 249, (advocating a "universality exception" to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and arguing the possibility that a
search is reasonable if applied equally to every member of the population);
Lewis, supra note 14, at 531 n.89 (putting forth the idea of eliminating the
controversy of DNA databasing by mandatorily sampling all newborns in the
U.S., in addition to all immigrants, and further pontificating on the social
usefulness of such a database); cf. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813,
842-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (arguing that a complete
DNA database of all citizens would aid in solving crime, but mass intrusion of
such an order runs contrary to the Founders' intent).
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releasees. The majority expressly declined to resolve the issue of
the constitutionality of the retention and searching of the DNA
profiles of individuals who have completed their terms of
release.1 25 The majority based the need to forego determination of
this issue on the retention of the DNA sample in the databank
(and also possibly in the digital DNA profile in CODIS) in light of
the shifting privacy interests of an ex-felon as he reintegrates into
society. The next section explores the possible implications of
these issues to supervised releasees in the future, and shows how
they further complicate a totality of the circumstances analysis in
determining the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of the DNA
Act.
1. Permanent Retention of DNA Profiles and Samples in the Face

of Shifting Privacy Interests-Reduced Expectations of Privacy do
not Extend Until Death
Recall that in taking a biological sample under the DNA Act,
a small amount of tissue or blood is taken which contains that
person's full genetic information. There is no present policy to
destroy these samples, which could potentially be tested at a
future time to reveal information about a person's heredity,
kinship, propensity for disease, presence of mental illness and
more.
Even academics who do not find DNA profiles and the CODIS
database to be a significant privacy threat have emphasized the
danger that retention of DNA samples represent.1 2 6 At least one
academic article has gone so far as to acknowledge the danger of
the possible use of DNA samples in future genetic research into
the biological roots of criminal behavior. 127 Some of the most avid
125. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15.
126. See, e.g., Tarricone, supra note 66, at 241(noting that irrespective of
the common misunderstandings regarding genetics, physical DNA samples in
storage contain a large amount of private information); Aaron B. Chapin,
Comment, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free Citizens Versus PostConvicted Persons and the Unconstitutionalityof DNA Dragnets, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1842, 1860 (arguing that it is indisputable that physical DNA samples
are ripe with private information); Maclin, supra note 20, at 169-70 (arguing
that the maintenance of DNA samples in the possession of the government
raises privacy concerns, and noting the potential of either abuse of that
information by the government or possible theft of it from the government).
127. David H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA
Databases, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 260 (2006) (postulating that
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supporters of CODIS in the academic world have endorsed the
policy that at minimum, DNA samples be destroyed after DNA
profiles are created and uploaded to CODIS. 128 Despite this, only
one state has a policy requiring destruction of DNA samples after
analysis and profiling is complete, and the FBI strongly opposes
an explicit policy of sample destruction.129
The First Circuit presciently pointed out that although
Weikert's reduced privacy interest was outweighed by the
governmental interests promulgated by the DNA Act, this reduced
expectation of privacy clearly changed with the expiration of the
period of conditional release. 130 Thus Weikert suggested that
probationers, parolees and supervised releasees may recover the
complete privacy interests of normal full-fledged citizens upon
completion of their respective programs and retention of their
DNA samples or profiles beyond the completion of their program
would require a separate balancing test that could shift the
balance in the former conditional releasee's favor.131
In
explicating its concern about the mutable privacy interests of
supervised releasees, the First Circuit relied heavily upon the
concurrence of J. Gould and the dissent of J. Kozinski in U.S. v.
Kincade,13 2 as well as the concurrence of J. Easterbrook in Green
13 3
v. Berge.
The concurrence in Green pointed out that courts have not
physical DNA samples could be re-examined in the future, focusing on loci
that disclose more personal information than those currently analyzed, thus
providing a tempting scientific research tool).
128. See, e.g., Tarricone, supra note 66, at 252 (arguing that DNA samples
should be destroyed after completion of the sentence).
129. National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, Proceedings,
Sept. 26, 1999, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/forensics/events/
dnamtgtrans7/trans-c.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (The FBI argued four
reasons for the retention of DNA evidence: (1) only one state requires
destruction after analysis; (2) there is tremendous difficulty in regenerating
or retyping databases after the samples have been destroyed; (3) the
destruction of DNA samples would affect the quality assurance of the DNA
database; and (4) there has been no real problem that warranted the
destruction of potentially useful samples, stating "DNA databasing has
occurred for ten years, and there has been no record of misuse of any sample
in a DNA analysis database.").
130. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
133. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004).
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differentiated between the diverse classes of people who are
required by law to contribute DNA samples for analysis and
cataloguing. i 34 The Weikert majority stated "the distinction [J.
Easterbrook] draws between current and former conditional
releasees strongly suggests that the constitutionality of the DNA
1 35
Act should be analyzed separately with respect to each group."
In Weikert, the court was also persuaded by Judge Gould's
Kincade concurrence, which noted that the majority in that case
did not conclude that an ex-felon's lawfully procured DNA sample
could constitutionally be kept by the government past the
temporal limits of the term imposed upon him. i 36 The First
Circuit also mentioned the dissents in Kincade, one of which said
that supervised releasees have a "full future expectation of
privacy,"' 37 while the other vigorously emphasized that "once [a
supervised releasee] completes his period of supervised release, he
becomes an ordinary citizen like everyone else," thereby
recovering his full Fourth Amendment rights in which the police
have no greater authority to invade his privacy sphere than any
other citizen. 138
Based upon these opinions, the Weikert majority held
[t]his authority alone suggests the wisdom of withholding
judgment on whether retaining a former conditional
releasee's DNA profile in CODIS passes constitutional
muster. The distinction in status between a current and
a former offender clearly translates to a change in the
privacy interests at stake. A former conditional releasee's
increased expectation of privacy warrants a separate
balancing of that privacy interest against the
government's interest in retaining his profile in
CODIS.

139

This view of the retention of DNA samples and/or profiles in
light of transforming privacy interests of ex-felons has received a
134. Green, 354 F.3d at 679.
135. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15-16.
136. Id. at 15 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 (Gould, J. concurring)).
137. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16 (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 870 (Reinhardt,
J. dissenting)).
138. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16 (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 871-72
(Kozinski, J. dissenting)).
139. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16.
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great deal of attention in the academic community, but relatively
little in the courts. 140
Despite the transforming privacy interests involved, no circuit
court has held that the DNA record of a human being (either the
profile or the sample) once entered into CODIS must be expunged
at some future time. 14 1 Taking into account both the changing
privacy interests of supervised releasees and the concerns about
indefinite retention of genetic samples and DNA profiles, Weikert
indicates the possibility that an ex-felon who brings suit to have
his DNA sample (and perhaps CODIS profile) expunged may be
successful. 14 2 The Supreme Court has held that probationers and
parolees do not have "the absolute liberty" that normal citizens
have, but "only... conditional liberty dependent on observance of
special restrictions." 14 3
But the Supreme Court has never
explicitly held that being on probation, parole or supervised
release permanently reduces or eliminates an individual's privacy
expectation.
It will be interesting to see in the near future
whether the First Circuit, if presented with the issue, orders the
expungement of a supervised releasee's DNA sample and profile
as Weikert intimates they might. Should the First Circuit indeed
order such expungement, it will undoubtedly be fascinating to
observe the Supreme Court's response.
2. Time and Time Again: Each use of CODIS may be a Fourth
Amendment Search of the DNA Profiles it Contains
One of Weikert's most interesting legal points, which the court
140. See, e.g., Monteleoni, supra note 107, at 270 (contending that it is
unreasonable for the government to be able to "tag" someone by taking their
DNA sample and profile while they are in a temporary state of having
weakened privacy interests, then maintaining that sample and profile when
the individual becomes free of the judicial system and once more has a full
expectation of privacy); Kaye, Two Fallacies,supra note 89, at 425 (pointing
out the danger of rationalizing the idea that a criminal conviction equates
with a permanent sacrifice of Fourth Amendment rights).
141. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16 n.13.
142. Id. at 16-17; see also Tarricone, supra note 66, at 229-30 (conjecturing
that the Ninth Circuit, based on the Kincade decision, would similarly allow
for expungement of an ex-probationer, parolee, or supervised releasee's DNA
information based upon their fully restored privacy interest outweighing the
government's interest in preventing crime).
143. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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raised and then failed to pursue, is the possibility that not only
the blood extraction, but also the analysis of the DNA, 144 and even
the subsequent acts of comparing the DNA profiles within the
database are each separate searches potentially requiring
separate Fourth Amendment analytical considerations.
The District Court indicated that both the taking of the DNA
sample and the later analysis of that sample were intrusions upon
an individual's privacy interest. 14 5 Furthermore, the lower court
distinguished prior cases dealing with the level of intrusion
authorized by the taking of blood samples 146 by noting that at the
time those cases were decided, courts were not faced with a
massive system in which an unlimited number of searches could
be performed upon the procured samples. 14 7 The First Circuit
acknowledged this argument, noting that 'Weikert's privacy is
implicated not only by the blood draw, but also by the creation of
his DNA profile and the entry of the profile into CODIS,"'148 then
simply skipped over it. This is unfortunate, as in many ways the
issues brought up by this idea are very radical and thoughtprovoking.
Two circuit courts have held that maintaining DNA profiles in
CODIS following a probationer's completion of his program are
constitutional: the D.C. Circuit in Johnson v. Quander,149 and the
144.

This idea is not unprecedented, and has even been discussed by the

Supreme Court. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec.s' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602,

616 (1989) (holding that not only does the physical intrusion to extract blood

from an individual for alcohol testing infringe upon a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy, but also that the analysis of that blood sample to
glean information from that person is an additional invasion of privacy
interests); see also Tarricone, supra note 66, at 246 (pointing out that Skinner
might mean that not only the blood extraction and creation of a person's DNA

profile are searches, but also that all future analyses of that profile are
searches, each of which necessitates a separate reasonableness analysis).
145. United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D.Mass 2006).

146.

See, e.g. Schmerber v. California, 328 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a

compelled blood test to analyze alcohol content for suspect arrested for
drunk-driving was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
147. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 867
(Reinhardt, J. dissenting)).
148. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007).
149. Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Johnson, a
probationer challenged not only the constitutionality of the government
collecting his blood for DNA profiling and inclusion into CODIS while he was
on probation, but he also challenged the constitutionality of the government's
retaining his DNA profile and "re-searching" it in the CODIS database after
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Second Circuit in United States v. Amerson. 150 Yet neither of
these decisions is analytically sound and reliance upon them as
authority should a supervised releasee attempt to expunge his
DNA Profile from CODIS would be a mistake.
In opposition to the holdings of Johnson and Amerson, the
Weikert majority tentatively breeched the issue that supervised
releasees, and presumably others, may retain constitutionally
cognizable privacy rights in the future uses of information which
the government has lawfully seized. The Weikert majority stated
that the time may be ripe to reconsider the previous Fourth
Amendment paradigm. This paradigm deemed that so long as the
government had seized personal information within the bounds of
the law and the Constitution, that the person to whom that
information pertained thereafter lost any expectation of privacy he
may have had in that information 151
The majority cited an article by Harold J. Krent which argued
his probationary term expired. Id. at 492. The D.C. Circuit held that
"accessing the records stored in the CODIS database is not a 'search' for
Fourth Amendment purposes. As the Supreme Court has held, the process of
matching one piece of personal information against government records does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 498 (citing Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S.321 (1987)). The Johnson decision thus summarily ignores the
logical likelihood that the "government records" implicated in the use of
CODIS are themselves pieces of personal information, and makes a simple
analogy to Hicks (involving the matching of stereo component serial numbers
with a police list of stolen stereos) an extreme stretch. Furthermore, the
analogy to Hicks by the D.C. Circuit is specious because the issue in Hicks, as
framed by Justice Scalia (who authored the opinion) was whether the 'plain
view' doctrine may be invoked when the police have less than probable cause
to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband."
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. Johnson also attempts to use the familiar analogy of
DNA profiling to fingerprinting and mug-shots, which was discussed earlier
in this paper in part III.A.2. The D.C. Circuit goes on to justify its decision in
saying that if it did accept the petitioners argument that each matching of
DNA profiles in the CODIS database was a Fourth Amendment search it
would be too bothersome for the police: "the consequences . . . would be
staggering: Police departments across the country could face an intolerable
burden if every 'search' of an ordinary fingerprint database were subject to
Fourth Amendment challenges. The same applies to DNA fingerprints."
Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499.
150. United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007). Amerson
justifies DNA profile and sample retention as an afterthought, providing
little analysis or consideration of the implications of changing privacy
interests or future searches.
151. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16.
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"that the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the uses that law
enforcement authorities make of property and information even
[following] a lawful seizure." 15 2 This article persuasively forces
the reader to consider what Johnson and Amerson dismiss-that
not simply the initial seizure of information, but each and every
additional use of that information potentially brings the Fourth
Amendment into play because use of private information by the
government saps an individual's ability to exercise control over
it. 15 3 Krent states,
[b]ecause the original seizure no longer extinguishes all
property or privacy rights of the individual, governmental
authorities violate the Fourth Amendment if they use
property or information unreasonably even when lawfully
obtained. Particularly in light of new technology, privacy
is threatened as much by what law enforcement
authorities do with information as by the original
15 4
acquisition itself.
Krent also argues that the intended use by the government is
not a factor divorced from the constitutionality of the seizure
itself. 15 5
Furthermore, he asserts that subsequent uses of
constitutionally seized items may be an even greater privacy
intrusion than the initial seizure, and thus subsequent uses of
such information must be "re-balanced" before such uses are
deemed constitutional. 156
Although this view may represent a re-conceptualization of
the current Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, the
rapid advance in technology and the exponential growth of the
CODIS program may demand such an approach. 1 57 Such a
framework would no doubt be time-consuming and place a heavy
burden upon law enforcement to justify accessing its cache of DNA
profiles; it may even make use of such a database constitutionally
impossible. However, there is a valid constitutional argument
158
that such a paradigmatic overhaul should be considered.
152. Krent, supra note 68, at 51 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 51 n.14.
154.

Id. at 60.

155. Id. at 64.
156. Id. at 69.
157. Id. at 92-93 n.199.
158. For an explanation of the contrasting view that all subsequent uses of
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The U.S. Constitution predates the recognition of the
importance of Mendelian genetics by over 100 years, and the
discovery of DNA by nearly two centuries.
Original and
antiquated ideas of the literal protections of one's cabin and
carriage may need to give way to a larger "gestalt" view of the
individual which reaches beyond the physical body and
acknowledges a person's interest in invisible information about
them. It may be time for courts to recognize an interest in
"genetic privacy" or "informational privacy."
We already
colloquially speak of "identity theft," which is at bottom a stealing
of digital information, and this digital "identity" is certainly
something in which most citizens would recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Surely one's DNA profile in CODIS is no
less private.
C. Weighing the Interests
It appears that the mechanical application of balancing
government interests against the privacy interests of supervised
releasees is not as clear cut as the circuit courts would have it.
The Weikert majority stated, "[i]n short, there may be a persuasive
argument on different facts that an individual retains an
1 59
expectation of privacy in the future uses of her DNA profile.'
Because of this possibility, the First Circuit deemed it "wise" to
circumvent making any explicit holding regarding the
constitutional interests implicated by the government's current
policy of failing to destroy DNA samples and profiles of
probationers and parolees who have fulfilled their debt to
society. 160 It cannot be denied that much remains unknown about
DNA. Yet lack of information does not necessarily make the
"decision not to decide" on the constitutional issues potentially
implicated by CODIS as they apply to supervised releasees, or the
population in general, "wise." Weikert and the general line of
circuit court decisions which have faced the issue of the Fourth
Amendment constitutionality of DNA sampling, databasing and
DNA profiles are legitimate, see Kaye & Smith, supra note 25, at 428
(arguing that additional uses of lawfully seized evidence in future criminal
investigations may have detrimental effects upon a defendant, but that does
not mean that these future uses are necessarily additional searches).
159. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2007).
160. Id.
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profiling have either maintained the status quo based upon
questionable and result-oriented reasoning or have decided to wait
for more information. The problem with a waiting approach is
that 'lack of information at the present time' is not a non-fact; it is
perhaps the most salient present circumstance that should be
considered in Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances
analysis.
It is precisely because we currently do not know the potential
of DNA profiles to reveal information, and precisely because we
have not considered supervised releasees changing privacy
interests more fully that Fourth Amendment limits on DNA
databases should be set now. Should the issue be taken up in the
future, as the Weikert decision suggests, and the DNA Act is found
to be unconstitutional, rather than 'wise,' it will more likely seem
unforgivably naive to have foregone the opportunity to slow down
the ravenous expansion of the CODIS database. In the future it
may be Sisyphean to try to 'roll back' technologies the court now
tacitly endorses, particularly because as a direct result of
decisions such as Weikert we will have become increasingly inured
to the government's sticky fingers fumbling through the nuclei of
our cells.
CONCLUSION: AT HOME IN THE FISHBOWL

16 1

The Weikert majority touched upon issues of monumental
import, but has missed its chance to draw a meaningful line which
delineates personal privacy interests from a technology that is
inexorably creeping into the lives of not only supervised releasees
and convicts, but all U.S. citizens. Already some states allow for
the DNA sampling and entry into CODIS of mere arrestees 162 and
161. U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.
dissenting) ('My colleagues in the plurality assure us that, when [the
inevitable expansion of CODIS] comes, they will stand vigilant and guard the
line, but by then the line - never clear to begin with - will have shifted. The
fishbowl will look like home.').
162. Maclin, supra note 20, at 165. The states of Louisiana and Virginia
have statutorily authorized DNA sampling of people arrested for some
offenses. See LA REV. STAT. ANN. §15:609(A)(1) (2004) (authorizing the taking
of DNA samples from those arrested for the commission of a felony and other
specified offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (1996) (allowing for taking
and analysis of a DNA sample from every person arrested for the commission
or attempted commission of a violent crime).
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DNA dragnets of professed voluntary samples from communities
are not uncommon phenomena.' 6 3 In addition, the U.S. Army has
a significant number of offender profiles in CODIS, i 6 4 and the
military has a remains-identification DNA database (which all
members of the military are required to submit DNA samples to)
that has been accessed for law-enforcement purposes.' 65 The
expansion of the DNA database is not limited simply to 'them,' but
is quickly expanding to include 'us.' The Weikert decision itself
has already become another footnote in yet another DNA
databank decision unsurprisingly holding that DNA collection
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.1 6 6 Rather than the
battleground of the struggle between the limits of our individual
constitutional freedoms and of the protection of the populace from
government prying, like all other circuit court decisions Weikert
has been reduced to nothing more than 'persuasive authority.'
Part I of this casenote set forth the scientific and statutory
background of government DNA Profiling, CODIS, and the DNA
Act. Part II presented an overview of the controlling Supreme
Court law that applies to suspicionless, warrantless searches of
supervised releasees such as Weikert. Part III presented an
analysis of the Weikert decision itself, particularly in light of
Samson v. California. Part III, Section A argued that there is an
utter lack of empirical evidence that the DNA Act effects the
governmental interests put forth in Weikert, while Section B
illustrated that the privacy interests of supervised releasees
evolve over time and that the use of DNA database searches may
necessitate a more complex view of what a Fourth Amendment
'search' is.
Part III, Section C argued that weighing this
reconfiguration of the governmental and privacy interests, the
balancing of these factors in light of these complications should
favor the individual privacy interests of a supervised releasee and
163. See e.g. Chapin, supra note 127, at 1844-46 (tracing the history of
DNA dragnets in Great Britain and the United States).
164. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS, NDIS Statistics for U.S.
Army Stats, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/army.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2008) (the U.S. Army has 9,504 offender profiles in CODIS as of November
25, 2008).
165. See e.g. Patricia A. Ham, An Army of Suspects: The History and
Constitutionalityof the U.S. Military'sDNA Repository and Its Access for Law
Enforcement Purposes,ARMY LAW. 1 (July/August 2003).
166. United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007).
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that DNA databasing such as the DNA Act is not constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.
The numbing effect of each successive encroachment into
one's personal information makes it increasingly implausible that
successive generations will view each subsequent government
intrusion into their lives as 'unreasonable.' Each governmental
step into our DNA makes it more unlikely that courts in the
future will simply be able to bring to heel the government use of
extant technologies when it believes things have gone too far.
Instead of waiting to see if the parade of horribles will come, it is
time that the courts realize the parade of horribles is here, and
that protection of the Fourth Amendment rights of supervised
releasees such as Weikert are ultimately our own protections.
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